The financial sustainability and the income adequacy of the Spanish pension system by Peralta Brullo, Walter Hugo
The financial sustainability
and the income adequacy of
the Spanish pension system
Walter Hugo Peralta Brullo
UB – Faculty of Economics and Business
17th June 2016
ABSTRACT AND KEY WORDS
Social insurance program is a universal model provided by the Pubic Sector with the aim of
covering risks such as retirement, widowhood or disability over the population with the provision of
either  cash payments  or  services.  One of  the popular  cash payments  is  the pension-retirement
income. In Spain, this pension is based on a pay-as-you-go system (PAYG). But the Spanish pension
system has to face some structural problems, like the aging of population and the increase in the
dependency ratio. After some reforms were initiated in order to improve the financial sustainability
of the pension system, some other strategies have been proposed to enhance these reforms, such as
changing the way pensions are based, i.e. a shifting from PAYG to other pension plans like defined-
benefit plans (DB) or defined-contribution plans (DC). A cross-country comparison between Spain
and Denmark will give us an insight of the differences between these two countries and try to ask
whether the pension system of a well-performed country can also be a good solution for Spain. 
Social security, PAYG, DB, DC, pensions, provision, financial sustainability, income adequacy, dependency ratio
3
INDEX
Introduction -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3
A) Context and Problems --------------------------------------------------------------------------4
1. Definitions -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4
2. Spanish Pension System --------------------------------------------------------------------7
3. Problems --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------10
3.1. Causes of the imbalance in the Spanish pension system -----------------10
3.2. Overview in EU pension systems ---------------------------------------------14
B) Strategies and Reforms ------------------------------------------------------------------------15
4. Strategies --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------15
4.1. Changing Key Parameters -----------------------------------------------------16
4.2. Extra-Funding --------------------------------------------------------------------19
5. Reforms ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------21
5.1 Spanish reforms: 2011-2013 ----------------------------------------------------21
5.2 EU reforms -------------------------------------------------------------------------23
C) Cross-Country Comparison: Denmark vs. Spain ----------------------------------------24
D) Conclusions: some highlights -----------------------------------------------------------------32
Bibliography ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------34
2
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this essay is to analyze the problem of the sustainability of the Spanish pension
system, its challenges and also some solutions that have been proposed. The present essay is
structured  as  follows:  First,  I  will  describe  some  concepts  and  definitions  about  social
insurance  programs,  pension  retirement  typologies  and  how  they  are  provided  to  the
population. Then I will introduce the Spanish pension system, in order to analyze the balance
and  the  reasons  of  its  unsustainability,  basically  due  to  the  aging  of  population  and
unemployment which affect the dependency ratio. Possible strategies have been proposed to
address these imbalances, such as  maintaining the current system by changing some minor
parameters, or finding extra resources by allowing the entrance of private provision plans.
While Spain has decided for the first strategy, some EU countries have chosen the second
option. The last section is a cross-country comparison between the Spanish pension system
and the Danish system, in order to evaluate social and financial sustainability. Finally, some
conclusions are developed about the advantages and drawbacks of the discussed reforms. 
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A) CONTEXT AND PROBLEMS
1. DEFINITIONS
Social insurance programs1
A social insurance program can be generally defined as the set of programs that under a
more or less direct supervision of the public sector provide citizens with cash payments or
services, either when they face a lack in their income or suffer a physical disability to generate
them. Thus, it protects citizens from a number of risks that arise in a given society. Typical
risks  that  can  be  considered  among others  are  unemployment,  old age,  sickness  or  work
accident, family responsibilities or death. 
Covered risks, benefit levels and source of funding differ from one country to another.
However, it is easy at least to recognize two different social security systems (INAP, 2008).
The first social insurance system is the professional model or Bismarck model. It was aimed
to  protect  only  salaried  workforce,  being  their  wages  what  determine  the  amount  of
contribution and the perceived benefits. This model was first appeared under the mandate of
Bismarck in Germany back in the late nineteenth century and it is considered the first social
insurance program introduced in Europe. 
The other historical model of social insurance is the  universal model, created after the
New Deal of US President Roosevelt, as a political response to the social consequences of the
Great  Depression.  It  was  intended  to  provide  a  minimum  level  of  income  required  for
subsistence of all beneficiaries. The main difference with the professional model is that it
covers a single risk by a uniform granted protection to the entire population. 
Some  other  classifications  have  been  employed  to  distinguish  more  precisely  social
insurance  programs  over  the  last  years.  Two  of  them  were  developed  by  international
organizations such as the World Bank and the OECD. In the first place, the World Bank’s
1 A note on terminology: in Spain we are more used or inclined to use the term social security system to refer to our PAYG 
pension scheme.
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classification  (World  Bank,  1994)  begins  to  distinguish  three  pillars  of  social  insurance
programs. The first one represents a public payment with a mandatory participation. Its aim is
to  reduce  poverty  among  the  old  people.  The  first  pillar  has  a  parallel  feature  with  the
universal model.  On the other side,  the second is a privately managed mandatory savings
system or earnings-related pension similar to the professional model. Finally, the third pillar
constitutes all the rest of voluntary savings. 
This  taxonomy  applied  by  the  World  Bank  is  however  prescriptive  rather  than  a
descriptive classification. Alternatively, the OECD classification wanted to improve the social
insurance classification by distinguishing three tiers.  (OECD, 2006) (OECD, 2014). These
tiers are more or less similar to World Bank's three pillars, but with the slightly difference in
the second group, in which the earnings-related pension provision has not only an insurance
role and mandatory participation, but also it can either be provided by the public or the private
sector. 
Finally, there is another classification that categorizes pension systems with its respective
aims. In this case, we can classify pension systems as either those with a redistributive aim or
with an insurance one. Whereas redistributive designs ensures that pensioners achieve some
minimum standard of living, insurance components are arranged to achieve a proportional
target  of  adequacy  in  retirement  incomes  compared  with  previous  working  earnings.
However, both of them can also be compared to the professional model and the universal
model.
Using the descriptive taxonomy employed by OECD, we may observe that one of the risks
that are usually covered by social insurance programs is the loss of income that people suffer
when  they  retire  from  the  labour  market.  Retirement  is  usually  covered  by  providing
retirement-income payments or pensions to retirees. In this essay, we will focus specially on
the second-tier provision. In this group,  pension plans are the only vehicles for retirement,
which can be financed by paying contributions to different plans during the working life, so
that they are accrued to finance retirement pension. Such pension plans include pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) public pension plans, as well as defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC)
funded  private  pension  plans.  Contributing  to  these  plans  can  be  either  mandatory  or
voluntary. 
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PAYG plan is the unfunded version of a DB plan.  A PAYG  means that at all times the
pension is already defined and obtained at the time of retirement according to some actuarial
rules  and the contributor's  labour  history.  Furthermore,  social  benefits  such as  retirement,
disability, widowhood, orphans and others are paid from the income received each year from
the contributors. Thus, a pension that a retiree receives in 2016 depends on the contributions
of workers on this year. Yet, associated reserves may cover immediate expenses or reduce
contributions  in public  schemes within given time periods,  such as economic or financial
crisis.
The other  retirement  plans  are  based either  in  DB-funded or  DC plans.  While  in  DB
schemes the amount a pensioner will receive depends on the number of years of contributions
made during the working life, like in a PAYG plans, in DC plans each contribution's worker
are saved and invested into an annuity (a guaranteed pension payment until death), and when
retirement comes the annuity is converted into a pension-income stream. The future returns on
the investments in DC schemes are however not known in advance, so it may be that a certain
level of contributions won't be enough to meet determinate benefits. 
In  a  DB funded model,  the  pension  uses  contributions  to  build  a  fund  in  which  the
sponsoring employer promises to pay a future benefit calculated as a proportion of salary and
years of service. The DC scheme also uses contributions to build a fund, but in this case the
pension that  is  eventually  paid  out  depends  on the  investment  performance of  the  assets
acquired by the pension fund, minus fees charged by the supplier and other intermediaries
(Blackburn, 2006). DB plans can be provided either by the private or by the public sector. On
the other hand, DC are provided by the private sector. Finally, there are other pension plans
based on accounts called notional defined contribution system (NDC), which is a combination
of the previous plans. 
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2. SPANISH PENSION SYSTEM
Situation of the Spanish earnings-related pension system
The national social security in Spain managed by the “Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad
Social” (INSS) is the main public social insurance system established since 1978 (Española,
1978).  The  earnings-related  pension  system  are  called  contributive  pensions  and  its
expenditures are structured below in Table I. As we may observe, more than a 50% represents
the  payout  for  providing  retirement-income  pensions.  According  to  INE  data,  only
contributive pensions represents more than 85% of the total expenses.
Table I: Expenditure in contributive benefit programs, average 2006-2015. 
Source: INE
Retirement
Widowhood
Disability
Orphans
Family
The  retirement  pension  system is  based  on  a  PAYG  scheme.  It  consists  of  a  single,
earnings-related  benefit  with  a  professional  scope,  covering  certain  categories  of  the
population, and funded according to social contributors by a payroll tax (INAP, 2008) (CEFS,
2013).  This  way  of  funding  through  its  own  payroll  tax  differs  from  most  government
programs,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  system  was  meant  to  be  originally  designed  as  self-
financing. Paid partly by employees and partly by their employers, the revenues from this tax
go into special trust funds that finance benefit payments and cover determinate outlays.
If we analyze the balance of contributive pensions (Table II), the budget balance has been
stabilizing  during  the  last  couple  of  years,  after  a  huge  deficit  had  appeared  during  the
financial and public debt crisis years,. However, revenues are still not enough for covering
liabilities.  It  is  also  important  to  notice  that  even  though  there  is  a   light  reduction  of
retirement pensions during 2013, the upward trend since 2010 is expected to increase in the
following years.
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Table II: INSS Balance. Revenues and Net Expenses
Source: INE
revenues
liabilities
budget balance
retirement pensions
On the  revenues  side,  contributions  had  plummeted  from around  €76,000  in  2011  to
almost 72,000 in 2013 (Table III). This is due to the huge reduction of paid employment in
the economy as a consequence of the financial and public debt crisis during these years. The
raising trend detected up until  74,000 since 2013, however,  has not  reached the previous
levels of 2011.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
70,000
72,000
74,000
76,000
78,000
Table III: Contributions (general program)
Source: INE
A high-job destruction is most likely to be the explanation of this fall during the crisis
period, reaching its lowest point in 2013. The level of contributors (Table IV) has not reached
yet half of the loose of jobs during the last years, but it is expected to rise in the future if the
economical situation would improve. 
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Table IV: Contributors (general program)
Source: INE
On the expenditures side, the increase of retirees has a definite trend (Table V), surpassing
the amount of 8,400,000 in 2015. This translates into an increase of almost 7% since 2010. 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
7,500,000
8,000,000
8,500,000
Table V: Retirees
Source: INE
Also, if we measure the average pension retirement income as the relative to the entire
pension scheme (Table VI), it has risen over the last 6 years, from an average pension income
of less than €900 in 2010 to more than €1,000 in 2015. In conclusion, the two last line charts
show us a  financial  problem, meaning that the Spanish pension system is  not  sustainable
anymore. 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
800
900
1,000
1,100
Table VI: Average Pension
Source: INE
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3. PROBLEMS
3.1. Causes of the imbalance in the Spanish pension system: evolution of
revenues and expenses
Rise in expenditures and fall in revenues are related with two main structural problems of
great importance: the progressive aging of population and the change that is occurring in the
dependency  ratio,  defined  as  the  ratio  of  the  retired  people  to  the  the  active  population
(Ayuso, 2014). 
The aging of population has become one of the main problems for the sustainability of the
pension system. This is because of an improvement in the population life expectancy (INE,
2015). On Table VII, life expectancy at 65 years old clearly shows an upward trend. Thus,
life expectancy of a 65 years old would exceed 90 years in 2025, while for men would almost
reach 82 years old. Both of them have an increase of 5 and 4 years respectively as compared
with values from 2000. If the current trend continues in 2063 the life expectancy for women
would be 95 years and for men 91 years2. 
Table VII. Source: INE
2. When we talk about life expectancy of people of a certain age in a given year, we make reference to the average number of 
years of life that they are expected to live. 
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An increase in life expectancy would mean that a very large population known as the
baby-boomer generation will  reach the age of retirement in the following decades.  Baby-
boomers, which were born between the late fifties and the first half of the seventies of the
20th century, are helping to grow the weight of the population over 65 years up to 17% and it
is expected to reach 37% in 2052. This would mean that one of every three individuals would
have more than 65 years old. The INSS forecast data says also that the number of pensions
would rise in absolute terms from the current 9 million to 15 million in 2052 (CEFS, 2013).
Even with a modest public retirement provision,  pensions are already representing a huge
expenditure for the public finances.
As well as longevity increases steady, the aging effect is intensified by a decline in the
birth rate (Table VIII).  Following the trend initiated in 2010, the number of births in Spain
would decrease in the next years. In 2030, the annual birth would be down to 300,000, 33.3%
less than in the present. A slightly declining trend in fertility is expected to maintain this
projection. Furthermore, the average number of children per woman would be 1.24 in 2030
with a slightly drop afterwards, as compared with the current 1.27. 
Table VIII. Source: INE
The second problem that is behind the imbalance of the Spanish pension system is related
to the economic crisis, which fueled the current high unemployment in the country. A high job
destruction is putting in jeopardy the necessary sustainability of the pension system, because
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it  affects  the  number  of  contributors  and  the  amount  of  revenues  that  comes  from  the
contributions. The slow economic growth of the past decade has also worsened the problem.
The Spanish PAYGO system is  facing slow economic growth as  a  serious  concern of  its
sustainability, for it diminishes the resources of the pension system.
The combination of the aging of population and high unemployment produces a change in
the dependency ratio  (Duval, 2003). As data shows us clearly in  Table IX, the dependency
ratio is expected to rise almost 4 points up to 28% in 2014  (BE, 2009). A higher old-age
dependency ratio, which is defined as the ratio of population over 65 years to the population
of working age,  would mean that the pension system cannot be sustainable over the next
years. 
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Table IX: Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)
Source: World Bank
A solution  for  this  demographic  problem  would  be  the  inflow  of  immigrants,  but
according to the latest population forecast of INE in  Table X there would be a decrease in
population close to 12% during the period of 2025 to 2070, which would represent a fall of
about 5 million people. This result would occur as a consequence of high-job destruction and
the aging of the population.
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Table X: Population projections in Spain (2015-2070). 
Source: INE
In the short term, pension system revenues and expenditures depend on the business cycle.
Revenues from contributions will grow in times of economic growth and fall substantially in
depressive phases, as we may observe in Table XI. On the other side, pensions will rise if old-
age population is expected to increase. Following this pattern, in table XII it is shown how the
system is  going to  be  unsustainable  if  the  fall  in  resources  and  the  rise  in  pensions  are
maintaining its trend. 
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Table XI: number of contributors and level of unemployment
Source: INE
Contributors
Unemployees
Is the PAYG pension system sustainable by itself? With an increase of retirees due to the
baby-boom generation, a 27% unemployment and lower levels of GDP, all of these factors are
affecting the sustainability of the pension system. For example, the European Comission (EC)
clearly says that the  pension system is not sustainable by its own methods and that some
actions should have to be addressed many years ago, despite the fact that the country would
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not have faced an economic crisis (CEFS, 2013). 
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Table XII: Comparison of pensions towards the public resources and liabilities. Source: INE 
Pensions
Resources
Liabilities
3.2. Problems in EU pension systems
During the last years, organizations like the EC and the OECD are recommending reforms
that  would  lead  to  more  financially  sustainable  PAYG  pensions  and  also  for  stable  and
adequate incomes in old age. These reforms want to redesign the pension system in order to
help to soften the effects of the economic cycle and to incorporate the structural trends of the
revenues and the expenditures in such periods like an economic slow growth.  Problems in
European countries are more or less similar as in Spain: aging of the population characterized
by a sluggish economic growth and the increasing in government debt.
The aging population has a negative effect into PAYG financing schemes as we have seen,
since a decrease in the number of working-age people is not sustainable any longer if elderly
population is  increasing.  As data shows, the  share of individuals aged 65 and above  will
increase from 8% of the total world population in 2015 to almost 18% by 2050.  
The evolution of dependency ratios depends on mortality, fertility rates and migrations.
OECD  countries  have  seen  prolonged  increases  in  life  expectancy,  which  most  analysts
project to continue in the future, with an increasing number of pensioners  (OECD, 2013).
There have also been substantial declines in fertility, which, of course, will eventually reduce
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the  number  of  workers  entering  the  labour  market.  A fall  in  fertility  rates  below  the
replacement level implies shrinking generations. In the future, however, there is a great deal
of uncertainty over how fertility rates will evolve.
Finally, the economic crisis and lower economic growth with large government debt levels
in many OECD countries have added further tensions. High unemployment and record-low
interest and inflation rates persist. Government gross financial liabilities have increased from
55% of GDP in 2007 to 88% in 2014 on average across OECD countries, and public pension
expenditure  represents  on average  18% of  total  public  spending  (OECD, 2013).  It  is  not
remarkable that pension reforms has been part of the strategy followed by theses countries in
favor of consolidating public finances and cut debt ratios by acting on the spending side.
B) STRATEGIES AND REFORMS
Over the last years there has been multiple reforms in the area of pensions. Governments
have been either  changing some key parameters of PAYG systems by improving them, or
proceeding to look for extra resources by giving a larger role to DB-funded and DC plans.
Key parameters that can be changed are the increase of the retirement age, the rise of
contribution and taxes, removing wage callings or the adjustment of pensions to consumer
price index (CPI). However, some problems arise in every strategy and likewise the context of
every country may make this reforms even worst. In Spain some key parameters have been
changed,  introducing  sustainability  factors  and  changing  the  way  benefits  are  accrued.
Another strategy is changing the plan of the pension, i.e. from PAYG plans to DB-funded or
DC plans, in order to diversify the source of fundings. 
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4. STRATEGIES
4.1. Changing key parameters
Measures that can rely on changing some of the PAYG parameters are one of the reforms
that many countries are trying to implement into their pension systems. Some of the examples
are increasing retirement age, discouraging early retirement or changing the way benefits are
calculated. Improving PAYG systems by this way could help alleviate the expenditures on
retirement pensions in the future.
The first measure to be discussed is the increase in retirement age.  Currently, the legal
retirement age is 65 years in many countries, but the actual age is somehow below than 65
because of the existence of early retirement. In this sense, any measure that it is directed to
discourage the early retirement cases may also boost the extension of working life over 65
years. The aim is simply discouraging the laying off of workers prior to the retirement age by
raising the pensionable age and increasing incentives to work longer.  This has been one of the
main objectives for some economies, moving this key parameter beyond the mark of 65 years.
This  measure  may  have  positive  effects  on  the  financial  viability  system  from  two
perspectives:  increasing  the  active  population  that  can  potentially  contribute  (particularly
important, given the demographic prospects) and reducing the expenditure on pensions. (BE,
2009). Yet, working longer is not an option for everybody, either because of job strain or
declining health, no matter how high the pension age is set. Moreover, older workers who are
laid off the labour market usually enter into early-retirement programs. In order to strengthen
their  employability,  they usually need to acquire  new skills,  but  long-term unemployment
rates in the group of more-than-45 years old is still high, as we may observe in Table XIII. 
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Table XIII: unemployment
Source: INE
Total
+45 men
+45 women
There's  no need to  keep early retirement  systems if  employment difficulties  faced by
elderly are dealt by protection programs to help them to remain on the labour market longer.
In this case, it has to be met by a higher demand of this type of labour, that is employers who
are willing to employ older persons. Programs like lifelong learning to upgrade skills will
therefore become essential to retain older workers in the labour market and encouraging older
workers not to leave the labour market and increasing the effective retirement age. Modern
economies could have found better ways of retaining older workers in the labor market for
longer without cutting benefit entitlements, i.e. without raising pensionable age.
The finances of pension systems may also be improved by  raising  contribution rates or
reducing pension benefits.  An example  of  adjusting  PAYGO on this  way is  proposed by
Richard  Musgrave (Blackburn, 2006), who argued that one of the possible ways to reduce
public debt is to keep the same overall relationship between average income and pensioner
income. This can be done by a raise in contributions while at the same time reducing pension
benefits. UK has rightly applied this principle to the share of pensions in GDP, estimating that
pension income from all sources should achieve 13% to 14% of GDP by 2050 in order to
maintain  pensioners’ relative  income  (Blackburn,  2006).  Without  regard  to  Musgrave's
formula, fixing the financial  challenges of PAYG pension systems is only one part of the
equation.  The  other  part  relates  to  social  sustainability  and  whether  pensions  will  be
acceptable  in  its  adequacy  to  provide  good  living  conditions  for  older  people  in  the
future(OECD,  2013).  Furthermore,  raising  contributions  would  lead  to  distort  the  labour
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market.
Another  measure  proposed  is  removing  wage  ceilings  (maximum  and  minimum
contribution bases) on which contribution rates apply (BE, 2009). Since the minimum wage
limits are small in amount, the net revenue effect would be positive. This measure would also
increase  the  growth rate  of  contributions,  which  would  depend  strictly  on  the  growth  of
nominal wages, which is not the case for all income scales today due to the existence of these
limits,  which  are  updated  according  to  expected  inflation  (usually  below  the  growth  of
nominal wages). The removal of contribution limits would turn the tax into a proportional tax
and would remove its regressive character, so that distortions generated on the labor market
would be reduced. 
Usually, a ceiling is set on the earnings used both to calculate contribution liability and
pension benefits. Most pension systems include only part of the earnings up to a ceiling in
order to calculate pension benefits. This covered ceiling on the earnings is very important for
reducing the costs of the pension system. The logic behind such  ceilings  is that if higher-
income workers want to reach a higher replacement rate, they can save individually. Without
ceilings or also a high one would allow high-income earners to receive a high replacement
rate and no need to take voluntary private pensions  (OECD, 2005). However, some doubts
rise on this argument. Maximum contribution bases are introduced to reduce the taxation on
wage earnings and as a way to reduce firms' costs. 
Finally, the last key parameter to be discussed is the indexation or an strict adjustment of
pensions  with the consumer price index (CPI)  (OECD, 2005).  This  policy aims to  adjust
pension  benefits  with  the  CPI,  so  that  the  purchasing  power  of  pensions  is  preserved.
Currently,  all  pensions are  reevaluated with the inflation forecast  and being automatically
revised,  if  the  CPI  is  observed  higher  than  expected.  The  option  is  to  consider  also  an
automatic review of pensions in the event that the CPI observed would have been lower than
programmed,  as  well  as  taking a  price  index reference  constructed  from a representative
basket that fits better to power purchasing of retired people. However, this key parameter can
also be applied in the other sense, i.e. removing the strict adjustment of pensions with CPI
(BE, 2009). This is usually done in order to not to increase the deficit in the balance and so
improving the financial viability of the pension system. 
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All  these reforms exposed in this  chapter can be made without  modifying the current
system. But a PAYGO system can be made a little more flexible by means of private funding
mechanism. We will talk about this later on in the next section. 
4.2. Extra funding
The idea that modern governments have been long taken some responsibility for providing
for the needy has come to be viewed as one of its primary functions. However, the current
crisis of pension provision has been intensified by the idea that financial markets are better
mechanisms than the public provision. During the last decades in some countries, in order to
prefund PAYG mechanism, surplus in revenues was used either to pay off a portion of the
national  debt,  or  to  invest  in  public  infrastructures  (Blackburn,  2006).  These  forms  of
investment could generate future income which could be used to boost pension payments.
After  the  WWII,  some  countries  like  France  and   Germany  used  pension  funding  to
accumulate savings and increment national wealth. 
After these year, it has been clear the urge of reforming the pension system. For improving
the  financial  situation  of  the  pension  system,  it  has  been  suggested  the  advantages  of
supplementing  payroll  taxes  with  other  taxes  and  contributions  in  order  to  maintain  the
adequacy of pension provision in the future, when baby-boomers will retire. Blackburn agrees
with this idea of providing extra resources, recommending putting levies on capital instead of
using regressive taxes, like VAT or other consumption taxes, which do not mitigate inequality
and fail to make visible the contribution that an individual or company is making to the wider
society. According to Blackburn, a levy on capital rather than income or consumption is the
best solution for extra-funding resources, because it could be used to improve the employers’
contribution, spread risk, broaden coverage, and help the maintenance of the pension system
as well as more spending on health, education, R&D, and social infrastructure  (Blackburn,
2006). Yet, taxes on consumption and labour incomes are still high, while capital levies are
not that heavy. For Blackburn, it would be acceptable to prefund secondary pension provision,
with the accent on capital levies that are difficult to evade.
Instead of deciding which taxes are going to fund pensions, the change of provision has
19
been put into discussion as a better solution for extra-funding resources. As we have seen
previously, DB funded scheme and DC scheme are the main types provided by the private
sector. On the last years, some countries have given a larger role to private-funded retirement
provision to complement public PAYG. As OECD pointed out, this change in funding might
represent  in  the  future  the  main  source  of  retirement  financing,  like it  is  happening  in
Australia and Chile  (OECD, 2014). In some cases, the shift to private-funded provision is
because governments want to achieve more redistribution, as the professional-based character
of the contributions frequently leaves large numbers of women and minorities without full
coverage in some countries where they lack minimum pensions. Nonetheless, Spain has a
minimum pension income for those who are not into any professional employment category. 
A similar  to  the  DC pension system is  what  is  called  a  notional  defined-contribution
(NDC), introduced by Sweden in the 1990s in order to restore financial sustainability3. The
NDC model retains PAYG state financing but mimics a privately funded DC plan. Workers'
contribution continue to  pay for today’s pensioners  but  they are also credited to  notional
accounts, which get a rate of return linked to earnings growth. Retirement income is based on
the  notional  capital  workers  have  accumulated,  which  is  turned  into  annuities  through  a
formula  based  on life  expectancy  at  their  retirement  age  (The Economist,  2013).  As  life
expectancy for older people rises, the annuities become less generous. In this way pensions
automatically  respond to  rising  longevity.  Broadly  speaking,  notional  accounts  forces  the
pension  system  to  adjust  when  economic  and  demographic  changes  make  it  financially
unstable by fixing the contribution rate through both lower benefits and increasing working
age. 
3 To look forward on this topic, Vidal-Meliá and Domínguez Fabián (2004) measured the effect that pension
formula based on notional  account would have had on the initial  amount of retirement  pension and on the
system’s IRR if they were introduced in Spain.
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5. REFORMS
5.1. Spanish reforms: 2011 and 2013
The new law introduced in 2014 is a parametric reform, with some changes that affects
the retirement age, the minimum number of years of contribution  and years of contribution
period taken into account in the calculation.
The retirement age for a full benefit has been increased from 65 years to 65 years and two
months  in  2014,  with  a necessary  minimum years  of  contribution  of  15  to  qualify  for  a
pension benefit. The legal retirement age will be 67 years for both men and women in 2027.
However if an individual has 38.5 years of contributions retirement with full-pension benefits
is possible from age 65.
Two policies  have  been  introduced  into  the  pension  system:  an  Adjustment  Pensions
Index (IRP) applied from 2014 and a Sustainability Factor (FS) that will be introduced in
2019 (CEFS, 2013). IRP value is the result of applying the following formula:
where:
IRPt+1= Adjustment pension index in year t+1 (year in which the index is calculated).
g  I,t+1= Arithmetic moving average centered on t + 1, with eleven values of the rate of
variation in the amount of INSS revenues. For example, from the 2010-2020 period.
g  P,t+1= Arithmetic moving average centered on t + 1, with eleven values of the rate of
variation in the amount of INSS contributions. For example, from 2010 to 2020.
g  s,t+1= Arithmetic  moving  average  centered  on  t  +  1,  with  eleven  values  of  the  the
variation  in  the  average  pension  system  in  a  year  in  the  absence  of
revaluation in that year.
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I*t+1 = Geometric mean mobile, centered t + 1, with eleven values of the amount of INSS
revenues.
G*t+1 =Geometric mean mobile, centered t + 1, with eleven values of the amount of INSS
expenses.
α  =  Parameter  indicating  the  speed  of  adjustment  of  the  imbalances  in  the  system,
It takes a value between 0.25 and 0.33. 2015, α = 0.25.
The new pension benefits will take into account the growth of the life expectancy of the
new pensioners. Benefits are indexed to IRP and calculated according to different factors:
number of contributory pensions (the base is equal to the past earnings over the last 17 years
compared to 15 years previously). From 2022 the base will be calculated with the 25 annual
and indexed earnings. There is also a ceiling or maximum benefit amounting to EUR 43,164
in 2014  (OECD, 2013). Benefits will also be calculated according to the balance between
revenues and expenses. Lastly, pensions are not indexed to CPI. This measure prevents the
system to increase its deficit.
The benefit accrues according to the following schedule. A 50% of the base when the
minimum years of contribution is fulfilled. An extra 3% is accrued per year over the next 10
years, followed by 2% per year thereafter. The maximum accrual rate (100%) is reached after
35 years’ contributions. The maximum replacement rate relative to final salary is about 88%,
calculated on the standard assumptions for earnings growth and price inflation. Finally, there
is a ceiling to earnings for contributions and benefit purposes of €30,899 or 191% of average
earnings (OECD, 2013).
The measure aims to link the pension received to life expectancy. As part of the problem
arises as a result of increased life expectancy, adjusting in a more or less automatically way
the  amount  of  pensions  to  those  increments  of  life  expectancy,  it  would  favour  the
sustainability of the system  (BE, 2009). Yet, policies shall not focus only on the financial
problems of the pension systems, but also ensuring that pension systems provide adequate
retirement incomes to all workers. 
The Bank of Spain had considered in its review that it is necessary to evaluate and analyze
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other  reforms  that  might  complement  public  resources  tax  system,  as  for  instance  the
development of a funded system, which is known as second-tier or defined contribution (BE,
2009).
5.2. EU reforms
Some EU countries have implemented pension reforms between 2013 and 2015, a period
characterized by slow economic growth and increasing government debt. The most important
pension  reforms  aimed  to  solve  the  financial  sustainability  by  limiting  public  pension
expenditure without deteriorating retirement adequacy (OECD, 2013) (Pascuzzo, n.d.).
Facing with the problems of an aging population on public finances requires to maintain a
consolidation of public finances, so that the maintenance of a reduced public debt ratio to
GDP  would  absorb  further  possible  increases  in  public  spending.  In  this  regard,  the
commitments to medium-term fiscal rules laid down in the Stability Pact at European level
and in the budgetary stability laws at the national level remain the best guide to manage fiscal
policy (BE, 2009). 
One of the solutions that is said to be effective is immigration, but it does not offer an
efficient solution to the problem of old-age dependency ratio, since migrant populations also
experience lower birth-rate and increasing longevity(Blackburn, 2006). While an increase of
migrants would contribute modestly to public finances, it may not solve at all the problem of
financial sustainability4.
But the most popular reform has been the increase in retirement age (OECD, 2013). The
contribution base is enlarged while at the same time adequacy is preserved. However, there is
a trade-off between improving financial sustainability and increasing pension adequacy. An
increase (reduction) in pensions deteriorates (improve) financial balances.
Almost  no  country  has  employed  direct  nominal  benefit  cuts.  Instead  of  cutting  in
absolute terms, benefits were often reduced by switching the indexation in a less favourable
way.  Also,  according  to  OECD,  many  countries  raised  revenues  by  increasing  taxes  or
4 However, much more could be said on this topic, but it is not the purpose of this essay.
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contribution rates in DB systems. Other countries have taken measures with regard to increase
the  coverage  of  voluntary  private  pension  schemes  or  reducing  the  effective  taxation  of
pensioners’ income and also lowering management costs. 
C) CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON: DENMARK AND SPAIN
There are several key questions in order to analyze a cross-country pension system, such
as what is the country's target replacement rate, how strongly are pension entitlements linked
to earnings when working and how pensions are provided (Whitehouse, 2007). Depending on
the values of each of the key questions, the quality of pension systems varies highly. The
Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index (MMGPI) tries to examine pension systems over 20
countries that represent more than 55% of the world's population. One of the aims of this
index  is  to  compare  the  adequacy  and  sustainability  of  20  different  retirement  income
systems. 
Denmark is one of the countries that has well performed in the index results of the last
edition, with a value of 81.7 and being the highest score for 2015 (Pension & Keep, 2015). To
provide a brief summary thus far, Danish pension system is based on a minimum pension
income provided by the public sector and supplemented by earning-related pension benefits, a
DC plan and also other mandatory occupational schemes. Danish Retirement age is set at 67
years. 
Although  Spain  is  not  included  in  this  index,  MMGPI  is  a  useful  starting  point  to
considering the Danish pension system as a comparison point with the Spanish one and try to
ask whether the Danish pension system might be a good one for Spain. So in order to analyze
both countries, we will study how broadly are the differences between its pension systems and
including the OECD average pension system as a benchmark. This section will focus both on
adequacy and sustainability performance.
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a) Comparisons of Retirement Income Adequacy
The economic crisis and the population aging has put into pressure many pension systems
across OECD countries. The increase in government debt levels in many countries has led to
more  pension  reforms  during  the  last  years,  even  though  the  problem  of  financial
sustainability  is  not  new.  However,  concerns  about  income  adequacy  is  growing  in
importance, in a context of less generous indexation of pension benefits and retirees being
likely to outlive their accumulated resources. 
An aspect to bear in mind in a contributory pension system regarding income adequacy is
the intragenerational equity (Whitehouse, 2007) (Pascuzzo, n.d.), which is to be understood as
a certain standard of living between all members of the same generation, independently of
which sector were they employed and the guarantee of a minimum standard of living among
older people, such as minimum pensions. 
Two sets  of indicators  are  used for  analyzing social  sustainability  performance across
countries: replacement rate and old-age income poverty rate. Replacement rate is the ratio of
individual initial pension to individual pre-retirement earnings. With this measure, we are able
to  calculate  the  loss  of  purchasing  power  in  retirement  by means  of  the  percentage  of  a
worker's  pre-retirement  income  that  is  paid  out  by  a  pension  program  upon  retirement
compared to the last salary. In other words,  if a worker earns at the end of his working life
$5000 and at retirement is assigned an initial pension of $4000, the replacement rate is 80%.
Replacement rates are often measured either in gross or in net terms. Net replacement rate
takes  into  account  individual  net  pensions  relative  to  individual  net  earnings,  including
personal  income  taxes  and  social  security  contributions  paid  by  workers  and  pensioners
throughout  their  career,  under  the  assumption  that  workers  earn  the  same  percentage  of
lifetime average worker earnings. On the other side, old-age income poverty rate gives us an
indicator  of  poverty  rate  across  old-age  people.  Thus,  this  two  indicators  show  us  how
effectively a pension system works providing retirement income to retirees5. 
5 Women have slightly different replacement rates.
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To begin with replacement rates,  Table XIV shows that OECD countries have a gross
replacement  rate  in  average earnings around almost 53%. While Denmark has a value of
67.8%, Spain has the highest value with 82.1%. The differences across earning levels reflect
some features about the structure of the pension system, such as minimum pension income,
ceilings on earnings, the progressivity of the tax system and various tax measures that favor
pension income. So one of the reasons of why Spain has such a large value is because its
pension system tries to protect low-income workers (here defined as workers earning half of
average worker earnings) from old-age poverty by providing higher replacement rates for
them than for average worker earners. Thus, Spain provides generous pensions to full-career
workers on average earnings. The same replacement rate is shown at low-average earnings.
However, this value is lower than Denmark's,  which has a replacement rate of more than
107%, meaning that retirement benefits are thus higher than their earnings in working ages.
While  Spain  has  the  same  replacement  rates  without  regarding  of  the  level  of  average
earnings, Denmark has the highest value in the low-earning range and lower values in mid-
high ranges. A possible explanation of this pattern is that Denmark has not only DB-PAYG
plans, but also DC plans in the pension insurance market. 
The pattern of replacement rates across both countries is also different on a net basis. Net
replacement rates are generally higher than gross replacement rates (see Table XV). This shift
of values compared with the gross replacement rates reflects  the higher effective tax and
contribution rates that people pay on their earnings than on their pensions in retirement. This
is due to favourable treatment of pension income under social security contributions, as the
personal  tax  system  plays  an  important  role  in  supporting  pensioners  (OECD,  2013).
Additionally, average tax rates on retirement income are lower than on earnings, because of
the progressivity of the personal income taxes and the difference in amount between pension
entitlements and earnings, which are usually greater in amount.
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Table XIV: Gross pension replacement rates by earnings
Individual earnings, multiple of mean for men (women where different)
Pension age 0.5 1 1.5
Denmark 67  107.4  67.8  55.1  
Spain 65  82.1  82.1  82.1  
OECD34 65.5 64.5 52.9 47.8
Source: OECD pension models.
For low-average earners, the effect of taxes and contributions on net replacement rates is
moderate, as they pay less in taxes and contributions. As we may see on Table XV, the pattern
from gross replacement rates are the same in this table. High-income earners typically pay
more than the other ranges.  In many cases,  low-earners have retirement incomes that are
below the level of the standard reliefs in the personal income tax, such as allowances and
credits, so that they are often unable to benefit fully from any additional concessions granted
to  pensions  under  their  personal  income tax.  In  the  case  of  the  Spanish  pension  system,
redistributive programmes are not only granting a relatively high minimum income of around
one third of economy-wide average earnings, but also has ceilings to pensionable earnings of
around 160-185% of economy-wide average earnings that weaken the link between pay and
pensions  (OECD, 2005). Also, most tax systems give special treatment to pensions giving
additional allowances 
We have  seen  so  far  how replacement  rates  give  us  a  first  viewpoint  of  the  pension
performance, although it is not a comprehensive measure for furthering the pension system
analysis. In this case, it is necessary to also include retirement ages, life expectancy and the
indexation of pension benefits in order to determine how its value evolves over time and for
how long the pension benefit is paid  (Vidal-Meliá & Domínguez-Fabián, 2004). Thus, for
example, countries can more easily afford a higher replacement rate if the retirement age is
higher, for the benefit would be paid for a shorter period. 
But  another  important  indicator  has  to  be  considered  in  this  cross-country  adequacy
comparison and this is the rate of poverty6, where the poverty threshold is the proportion of
6 For international comparisons, the OECD treats poverty as a “relative” concept. The yardstick for poverty depends on the 
median household income in a particular country at a particular point in time. Here, the poverty threshold is set at 50% of 
median, equalized household disposable income. Thus, poverty is defined as an income below half the national median 
equalized household income.
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Table XV: Net pension replacement rates by earnings
Individual earnings, multiple of mean for men (women where different)
Pension age 0.5 1 1.5
Denmark 67  103.2  66.4  57.2  
Spain 65  89.1  89.5  89.3  
OECD34 65.5 74.1 63.2 58.5
Source: OECD pension models.
retirees  over  65s  with incomes below 50% of  the median equalized income7.  Table XVI
shows that on average in the OECD countries,  12.6% of individuals aged over 65 live in
relative income poverty. Poverty rates are higher for older people than for the population as a
whole, which averages 11.4%. Spain has a greater poverty ratio of 6.4, almost 4 points higher
than Denmark, considering that living standards of the retired people across the world are
generally lower than those of the working age population.  
 
Poverty among the retired population between 66 and 75 years old  is less frequent than
those aged 75 and over. A possible explanation of this pattern is that real earnings have tended
to grow over time, so that each successive cohort of retirees has higher benefits. This in turn
leads  to  higher  pensions  income  for  each  generation  over  time.  This  is  the  reason  why
indexation of pension benefits play an important role in protecting the income of the elderly
over longer periods of time. 
Retirement income is mainly a product of the past worklife. It depends on job and earning
historical  data  and  also  on  the  pension  rules  in  place  at  the  time  entitlements  accrued.
However, the labour market has given way to more flexible, but often more precarious jobs
such as part-time work, fixed-term contracts and various forms of self-employment. This is
the case of Spanish labour market. Many of today’s workers face growing job insecurity and
the need to continuously update their skills. Also working women in particular often use such
employment  contracts,  as  they  seek  to  reconcile  work  and  family  life.  In  all  case,  such
practices entail earnings losses and lower pensions. Likewise, Spanish high unemployment
rate is another life-course risk that affect individuals and households that may also account for
7. The data shown are for disposable incomes (i.e. net of personal income tax and social security contributions). Note that 
another advantage is that old-age people are owners of their homes with almost no debt derived from mortgage loans.
28
Table XVI: Income poverty rates by age 
Percentage with incomes less than 50% of median household disposable income
 2012 or latest availbale
Older people (aged over 65)
All 65+ 66-75 76+
Denmark 4.6 2.7 7.4 5.4
Spain 6.7 6.4 7.1 14.0
OECD 12.6 11.2 14.7 11.4
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database
Whole 
population
losses  of  earnings.  At  a  time of  persistently  high  unemployment and less  steady lifelong
careers, all the reforms we reviewed may result in lower pension entitlements for a country
like Spain. This is one of the main differences with Denmark economical context and also
giving the fact that unemployment in Spain is expected to remain higher than in Denmark
during the following years. 
Income adequacy is falling due to some pension reforms. The proportion of people that
may have a present value of pension income below the current poverty line is higher for
people on low income, women, private sector workers and self-employed people. In France,
younger generations may be more likely to have a present value of pension income below a
current relative poverty threshold than their elders due to reforms in the public pension system
leading to benefit cuts. In the United States also, younger generations may be at greater risk of
having a present value of pension income below a current measure of poverty. This may be
due to the rise in the official age of retirement and the shift from occupational DB plans to
occupational DC plans  (OECD, 2014).  The risk of failing replacement  rates  are  specially
found in Chile (due to lower rates of return on pension assets), the United States (due to the
shift of occupational provision from DB to DC plans), France, the Netherlands and Norway
(due to reforms leading to benefit cuts). In the United Kingdom, the risk is similar across
generations. Spain shall take note of all of these examples regarding to some future reforms.
Although the Danish pension system has a different structure than the Spanish, it  may be
reasonable not to loose also the economical context of the country.  Even DC schemes are not
immune  to  the  lowering  of  the  economy’s  output  potential  which  might  be  induced  by
demographic changes.
b) Comparisons of Fiscal Sustainability
Financial sustainability indicators are normally assessed via public expenditure on old-age
and survivors' benefits as a percentage of GDP and the required primary balance indicator that
translates  government  debt  ratios  into  projections  of  the  permanent  budgetary  adjustment
needed to ensure sustainable finances.
The first indicator shows public expenditure for the aged including pension benefits and
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“non-cash”  benefits.  Public  pensions  represent  the  single  largest  item  of  government
expenditure for the aged. A lower level of spending relative to GDP indicates less reliance on
the public purse.
On  Table XVII,  public  expenditure on cash benefits  for  old-age and survivors in  the
OECD increased a 28% between 1990 and 2011. Public pensions represent the largest single
item of social  expenditure,  accounting for 18% of total  government spending on average.
Denmark has lower levels compared with OECD (7.9% in 20111), with a 6.2% in 2011. The
level  of  public  expenditure  on  cash  benefits  for  old-age  measured  in  %  of  the  total
government spending is less than 11%. While this value is 17.5% for the OECD countries,
Spain has the highest value, with almost 23%. It is clear after looking at this levels that the
Spanish pension system represents a huge amount of the total government spending, more
than Denmark and the average of the OECD countries. 
The increase in the rate of contribution would have positive effects on the Spanish pension
system, since it means higher revenues without increasing expenses on the other side, as the
calculation  of  the  amount  of  the  pension  does  not  depend  on  the  type  of  contribution.
However,  an  increase  in  contribution  rates  could  have  very  negative  consequences  on
employment, as it would cause a sharp increase in labor costs, if a parallel reduction of gross
wages  did  not  occur  (BE,  2009).  This  measure  may have  a  strong impact  in  the  fragile
Spanish labour market. But an adjustment of this type is difficult, especially when intensified
by  the  change  in  dependency  ratio  due  to  the  retirement  of  baby  boomers  and the  high
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Table XVII: Public expenditure on old-age and survivors benefits
Public expenditure on cash benefits for old-age and survivors
Level (%of GDP) Change
1990 1995 2000 2005 2011 1990-2011 1990 2011
Denmark 5.1 6.2 5.3 5.4 6.2 21.4% 9.2 10.8
Spain 7.9 9.0 8.6 8.1 10.5 32.4% 22.9
OECD 6.2 6.7 6.8 7.0 7.9 27.8% 17.5
Source: OECD Social Expenditures Database (SOCX) ; OECD Main Economic Indicators Database.
Level (% of total 
government spending)
unemployment situation of Spain.
Moreover,  this situation can be worsened due to the demographic old-age dependency
ratio of Spain (Table XVIII). The ageing of population has been one of the main driving
forces behind the wave of pension reforms in recent years. The ratio is expected to increase by
15  points  in  2075,  keeping  age  thresholds  constant.  At  the  moment,  there  are  28  (27.3)
individuals aged over 65 for every 100 persons of working age (ages 20 to 64) on average
across all OECD countries. In 1950 the dependency ratio was equal to 14, and has increased
to 28 in 2015. The demographic dependency ratio is expected to continue to increase and to
reach 35 in 2025, 51 in 2050 and 55 by 2075. So there is a positive relationship between
comparing  public  pension  expenditure  with  the  old  age  dependency  ratio  (OECD Social
Expenditure Database).
The last financial sustainability indicator is the Required Primary Balance. It is sourced
from Standard and Poor’s  (Standard and Poor's  2010B) and it  translates government  debt
ratios into projections of the permanent budgetary adjustment that is needed to ensure the
sustainability of public finances. More specifically, based on methodology published by the
European  Commission  (Standard  and  Poor's  2010A),  the  sustainability  gap  indicates  the
difference between the current structural primary fiscal balance and that which would result in
intertemporal  budgetary  balance  over  an  infinite  time  horizon,  measuring the  fiscal
adjustment required to bring public finances back to sustainable track. The sustainability gap
for Denmark is 4.6%, while for Spain is more than twice with a value of 8.7% (Mrsnik, Beers,
& Morozov, 2010). This means that Spain's primary balance must be greater than projected by
8.7% of GDP for each future year by increasing taxes or cutting expenditures 8.7% of GDP. 
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1950 1975 2000 2015 2025 2050 2075
Denmark 15.6 23.7 24.2 32.2 37.1 42.7 47.6
Spain 12.8 19.2 27.3 29.6 36.3 73.2 65.4
OECD (weigthed) 13.9 18.7 21.9 27.3 34.1 48.5 54.5
Source: OECD (2013)
Table XVIII: Table Demographic old-age dependency ratios: Historical and projected values, 
1950-2075
D) CONCLUSIONS: SOME HIGHLIGHTS
Drawing together the analysis above, Danish pension system performs well both in terms
of providing income adequacy and fiscal sustainability. The results provide a general guide as
to the relative performance of the various systems rather than being definitive. Even though
we have used only few indicators, the inclusion of more indicators would improve the results
and would consider alternative approaches and possible reform options. 
The results  for both countries features the trade off  between the objectives of income
adequacy and fiscal sustainability, since countries that perform well against one objective tend
to perform badly against the other. The increase of the contribution rate would have a positive
budgetary effect,  but  this  comes at  the expense of expenditures  in  working life  that  may
contribute  to  financial  hardship  or  changing  expenditures  such  as  education  unless  this
measure is supported by other reforms.  The idea is to identify measures and reforms that
would improve the level of income adequacy without compromising fiscal sustainability. 
First of all,  the parametric reform of increasing the retirement age in Spain to 67 like
Denmark could have a significant impact on adequacy levels and on retirement outcomes,
with associated budgetary costs. However, this measure depends on the the ability of the aged
to  continue  working.  Even  though  contributions  are  essential  to  building  future  pension
entitlements, increasing pension age alone will not suffice. 
Encouraging other plans like DC like in Denmark eases the pressure on the public budget,
manages longevity risk and improves retirement income adequacy. DC funds are more likely
to  perform well  against  both  adequacy  and  sustainability  criteria,  and  also  they  are  less
vulnerable to demographic changes, so it may be a good strategy in terms of risk in relation to
the current system of distribution. However, the capitalization system is more sensitive to
inflationary  crisis  and,  as  showed  last  year,  to  instabilities  of  the  financial  markets.  In
addition,  the development  of  a  second tier  pension system is  complex and requires  prior
detailed analysis of issues such as the period of time required for implantation, its voluntary
or  mandatory  character,  or  the  cost  distribution  associated  with  the  change involving the
implementation  of  this  system  between  generations  (BE,  2009).  Also,  new  longer-term
difficulties have emerged in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis, such as low-
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interest  rate  environment,  which  makes  difficult  to  earn  the  returns  necessary  to  achieve
adequate pension levels in DC schemes if rates of return remain low.
Supplying a universal basic pension with a PAYGO funding method through payroll taxes
has proved to be a highly cost-effective way of delivering retirement income  (Blackburn,
2006). As Orszag and Stiglitz pointed out in their work, a well-run public pension system
could deliver results  that were as good as—or better  than—those produced by a well-run
private  system.  To  put  things  forward,  they  mention  how  the  advocates  of  privatization
claimed that commercial competition would ensure that private pensions would be delivered
at low cost. Yet the evidence showed that suppliers chasing pension contracts that were to last
a  lifetime  had  a  motive  to  engage  in  exorbitant  marketing  expenditure.  Furthermore,
advocates of privatization generally accepted the need for public regulation. Paradoxically the
advocates of pension ‘privatization’ sometimes find that the only way to do this is by allowing
a huge role for the public sector. This will only come into being thanks either to massive
subsidies (tax relief) or to the state compulsion required to oblige citizens to contribute to a
supplied pension fund.
However, PAYGO system works best when age cohorts are of the same size, but it comes
under  strain  when  the  ratio  of  workers  to  pensioners  is  unbalanced.  A surplus  will  be
accumulated when there are too many workers and too few pensioners. If the the numbers of
pensioners rises sharply in relation to contributors, then the problem is either a shortfall in
pensions  or  a  steep and counterproductive  rise  in  payroll  taxes.  In  a  current  deflationary
economic  context,  high  payroll  taxes  aggravates  the  problem of  weak  demand.  It  is  not
demography, but  high unemployment, low growth, and deflation that are the problems for
PAYG system, and this is exactly the main situation in Spain, which Denmark does not have.
Could  rising  productivity  generate  rising  contributions  even  from  a  stationary  or
diminishing labor force? Sustainability of public finances may be relieved if employment and
productivity are improved. In this sense, the margin for improvement in our country requires
structural reforms in many areas,  such as labor and good and service markets,  as well  as
education and training of workers.
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